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Despite the escalation of football coaches’ salaries at National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Foot- 
ball Bowl Subdivision (FBS) institutions, little empirical investigation has been undertaken to identify the 
determinants of their compensation. As such, the purpose of this study is to explain how the level of coaching 
compensation is determined based on three theoretical perspectives in managerial compensation: marginal 
productivity theory, human capital theory, and managerialism. The analysis of compensation data of head foot- 
ball coaches at FBS institutions in 2006–2007 shows that the maximum total compensation of these coaches 
increases with their past performance. The results further reveal that coaches with greater human capital tend 
to receive a compensation package where bonuses account for a smaller proportion of the maximum total 
compensation. Overall, these findings mostly confirm the predictions drawn from managerial productivity 
theory, human capital theory and managerialism. 
 
The compensation of head football coaches at 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Foot- 
ball Bowl Subdivision (FBS) institutions is on the rise. 
The average salary of these coaches exceeded $1 million 
for the first time in 2007 (Upton & Wieberg, 2007). Just 
two years later, this value went up to $1.36 million, with at 
least 25 head coaches making over $2 million (Wieberg, 
Upton, Perez, & Berkowitz, 2009). In 2010, Mack Brown, 
head football coach at the University of Texas, became 
the first college football coach to be paid over $5 million 
annually (Berkowitz, 2009). However, this rapid increase 
in coaching compensation is in contradiction with recent 
financial problems facing U.S. universities. For instance, 
the University of California, Berkeley paid $2.8 mil- 
lion to its head football coach, Jeff Tedford, during the 
2009–2010 season despite a $150 million reduction in 
state funding that led to layoffs of faculty and staff and 
increased tuition (Zimbalist, 2010). Consequently, the 
escalation of football coaches’ salaries at FBS schools 
has caused considerable concern in the greater academic 
community, as indicated by the results of the Knight 
 
 
 
 
. 
Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics’ survey showing 
that over 85% of college presidents believe that college 
football coaches’ pay is excessive (Wieberg et al., 2009). 
Proponents of high coaches’ salaries contend, 
however, that the increase in coaching compensation is 
a reflection of the value of coaches in the labor market 
(Upton & Wieberg, 2007; Wieberg & Berkowitz, 2009; 
Zimbalist, 2010). That is, college football coaches are 
rewarded because of their on-field success and contribu- 
tion to increased revenues, and universities have to pay 
more for successful coaches if they wish to keep their pro- 
grams competitive and profitable. Indeed, this perspective 
is supported by some examples. Most notably, Nick Saban 
led the University of Alabama football program to win the 
national championship in 2010 and further increased its 
revenue by $9 million in the two years after he took over 
the head coaching job (Wieberg, 2010). Nevertheless, 
other examples suggest that this account may not always 
be valid. For example, Kirk Ferentz, head football coach 
at the University of Iowa, received a guaranteed salary of 
$3 million in 2007, irrespective of a mediocre 6–6 regular 
season record for the same year and his 55% winning 
percentage during the previous six years. At Texas A & 
M University, former head coach Mike Sherman earned 
$1.8 million in 2010 despite his 10–15 record over the 
past two years (Zimbalist, 2010). Furthermore, during the 
2011 season, four of the 10 highest paid college football 
coaches at FBS schools did not finish in the Associated 
Press (AP) Top 25 poll (McMurphy, 2011). 
 
 
 
  
 
These two conflicting views lead to a central ques- 
tion about what factors actually contribute to high com- 
pensation of college football coaches. Despite this, little 
empirical investigation has been undertaken to identify 
the determinants of college football coaches’ compen- 
sation. Furthermore, while several extant studies have 
examined factors that influence the compensation of elite 
sport coaches in other settings, these studies primarily 
focused on narrow aspects, such as gender (Brook & 
Foster, 2010; Humphreys, 2000), race (Kahn, 2006), and 
managerial quality (Frick & Simmons, 2008), and failed 
to provide comprehensive theoretical frameworks for the 
determinants of coaching compensation. 
As such, the purpose of this study is to explain how 
the compensation level of NCAA head football coaches 
is determined based on the implications drawn from three 
theoretical perspectives in managerial compensation: 
marginal productivity theory, human capital theory, and 
managerialism. Marginal productivity theory argues that 
the compensation of workers reflects the extent to which 
they contribute to the performance of their organizations 
(Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & Hinkin, 1987; Roberts, 1956), 
thereby predicting a high congruence between pay and 
performance of college football coaches. Second, human 
capital theory explains that managerial compensation is 
influenced by the amount of one’s skills and experience, 
which implies the high compensation of experienced 
coaches (Becker, 1964; Holcomb, Holmes, & Connelly, 
2009). Finally, according to managerialism, compen- 
sation structures are influenced by the level of power 
individuals have on the governance of their organizations 
(Combs & Skill, 2003; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; 
Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). Thus, coaches 
with greater power may be more likely to exert their 
discretion in the contracting process. 
Along with addressing an important and timely 
research question, the results of the current research 
can contribute to the literature by testing the effects of 
performance and human capital on managerial compensa- 
tion in an ideal context where (1) individual performance 
can be clearly defined in terms of wins and (2) detailed 
data on compensation, performance and human capital 
characteristics are available to the public (Bloom, 1999; 
Frick & Simmons, 2008; Kahn, 2000; Smart, Winfree, 
& Wolfe, 2008; Smart & Wolfe, 2003; Wolfe et al., 
2005). Moreover, the results of this study can advance 
the literature on managerial compensation by providing 
some of the first empirical evidence regarding the effect 
of managerial power on the structure of pay. 
 
Theoretical Background and 
Hypotheses 
Positive Relationship Between Past 
Performance and Total Compensation 
In the managerial compensation literature, marginal 
revenue product (MRP) refers to the difference between 
the actual level of firm performance achieved by its cur- 
rent executive and the expected amount of that firm’s 
performance achieved by the next best alternative execu- 
tive (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Roberts, 1956). Under 
the assumption that perfect information and alternatives 
are continuously available for both the executive and the 
firm, the executive is thought to receive compensation 
equal to the value of his or her MRP (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 1987; Roberts, 1956). However, since this assumption 
is unlikely to hold in reality, the actual compensation of 
executives tends to be lower than their MRPs (Gomez- 
Mejia et al., 1987; Roberts, 1956). Nevertheless, marginal 
productivity theory predicts that there is a positive linkage 
between executives’ pay and their performance, which 
has been supported by extant empirical evidence (e.g., 
Bushman, Indjejikian, & Smith, 1995, 1996; Healy, 1985; 
Ittner, Larcker, & Rajan, 1997; Lambert & Larcker, 1987; 
Sloan, 1993). 
The concept of MRP has been extensively applied 
to the sport setting. In particular, a substantial literature 
examined the MRP of a player in terms of “the ability or 
performance that he contributes to the team” (Scott, Long, 
& Somppi, 1985, p.52), and tested whether players’ sala- 
ries reflect their levels of MRPs (e.g., Krautmann, 1999; 
Scott et al., 1985; Scully, 1974). In addition, while less 
attention has been paid to the direct relationship between 
MRP and compensation of coaches, several researchers 
have shown that coaches can have a great effect on the 
performance of their teams, implying their high MRP in 
relation to team success (Frick & Simmons, 2008; Hadley, 
Poitras, Ruggiero & Knowles, 2000; Kahn, 1993). Kahn 
(1993), for example, demonstrated that the managerial 
quality of Major League Baseball (MLB) managers 
predicted by their past performance and experience sig- 
nificantly explained winning percentages of their teams, 
after controlling for the levels of player input. Hadley et 
al. (2000) also estimated that highly efficient National 
Football League (NFL) coaches could allow their teams 
to gain an additional three to four wins in a season. 
Similarly, Frick and Simmons (2008) examined the per- 
formance data of coaches in the Bundesliga (Germany’s 
premier soccer league) over a 22 year period, finding 
that head coaches with better quality had the ability to 
improve the performance of their teams. 
While the above studies (Frick & Simmons, 2008; 
Hadley et al., 2000; Kahn, 1993) highlighted the impor- 
tance of coaches in professional sport contexts, college 
coaches may play a greater role in the success of their ath- 
letic programs. In particular, coaches can have a significant 
impact on the talent development of individual players, 
which can manifest itself in better team performance in cur- 
rent and future seasons. Another major effect that coaches 
have on team performance is through the acquisition of 
talent. Unlike the majority of professional sports, talent 
assessment and selection is ultimately the responsibility of 
the head coach at the intercollegiate level. As such, it might 
be suggested that the managerial responsibility and core 
competencies of a college head coach and its staff would 
exceed that of their professional brethren. In line with this 
view, the fi of Smart and Wolfe (2000) indicated 
that organizational resources developed among coaching 
staffs are the critical sources of sustainable competitive 
  
 
 
 
advantage for intercollegiate athletic programs. Soebbing 
and Washington (2011) further found the significant     
effect of coaching succession on the subsequent 
performance of college football programs, confirming 
the important role coaches play in program success. 
Given the aforementioned discussion, highly suc- 
cessful coaches are viewed as a valuable asset for inter- 
collegiate athletics programs to achieve high on-field 
performance; universities are hence assumed to provide 
coaches with salaries that reflect their past performance 
to adequately reward their contributions to the program 
success. Consistent with this, Humphreys (2000) showed 
that NCAA basketball coaches with high career winning 
percentages tended to receive greater base salaries than 
those with lower winning percentages. This finding is 
replicated by Brook and Foster (2010) who examined the 
total compensation of NCAA men’s basketball during the 
2004–2005 season. Consequently, it is expected that the 
more successful a NCAA FBS head football coach has 
been in the past, the greater pay he receives. This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The maximum total compensation 
of the NCAA FBS head football coach is positively 
associated with his past performance. 
 
Positive Relationship Between Human Capital 
and Total Compensation 
Although the positive linkage between pay and perfor- 
mance is predicted on the basis of marginal productivity 
theory, the several examples provided in the introduction 
section suggest that college football coaches may not 
necessarily be paid based on their performance. We thus 
turn our attention to human capital theory to identify an 
additional factor contributing to the high compensation of 
college football coaches. According to this theory, while 
managerial ability is unobservable, it is often manifested 
in the amount of human capital that managers possess, 
such as “knowledge, skills, and experience” (Becker, 
1964; Holcomb et al., 2009, p.459). Consequently, a man- 
ager with a greater level of experience and knowledge is 
thought to be more capable of performing his or her job, 
and hence be qualified for receiving higher compensation 
(Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1964; Spence, 1973). 
Consistent with this proposition, Agarwal (1981), as 
one of the first to apply human capital theory to execu- 
tive pay, found that work experience measured by the 
number of working years had a significant positive effect 
on the compensation of chief executive officers (CEO). 
Subsequent studies further supported the positive effect 
of human capital (e.g., Banker, Plehn-Dujowich, & Xian, 
2010; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Fisher & Govin- 
darajan, 1992). By examining the compensation of profit 
center managers (PCM), Fisher and Govindarajan (1992) 
showed that a PCM’s compensation was positively asso- 
ciated with three measures of human capital: job tenure, 
firm tenure, and age. Banker et al. (2010) further found 
a positive relationship between human capital variables 
and the compensation of university presidents. 
In the coaching context, Frick and Simmons (2008) 
showed that the level of the coach’s human capital mea- 
sured by experience positively affected the compensation 
of head coaches at the Bundesliga. Smart et al. (2008) also 
found that the compensation of MLB managers were posi- 
tively correlated with experience related variables, such as 
age and number of years as a manager. The relationship 
between human capital and coaching compensation may 
be more apparent among college head football coaches, 
whose responsibilities include not only achieving high 
on-field performance but also other activities that would 
require high managerial ability, such as alumni and media 
relations, fundraising, the supervision of assistant coaches 
and staff, and program operations (Berman, 2008; Cohn, 
2008). As a result, it is suggested that the greater amount 
of human capital a college football coach possesses, the 
greater level of total compensation he is likely to receive. 
Our next hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: The maximum total compensation 
of the NCAA FBS head football coach is positively 
associated with his human capital. 
 
Negative Relationship Between Human Capital and 
Bonus Proportion 
Along with its positive effect on total compensation, 
human capital may affect the structure of coaching com- 
pensation, such that coaches with higher human capital 
tend to receive a lower percentage of their maximum 
total compensation as bonuses. This prediction can be 
explained from the following two perspectives. First, as 
discussed earlier, human capital variables serve as the 
signal of managerial ability (Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 
1964; Spence, 1973). As such, athletic administrators 
may see little need to encourage an experienced football 
coach to reveal his ability by providing incentives because 
the ability of that coach to perform his job is manifested 
in his high human capital. Rather, they may choose to 
guarantee the coach a high level of fixed compensation, 
which is not affected by the achievement of specific 
goals, to show their trust in his ability and establish a 
favorable relationship with him. 
Second, while human capital theory views human 
capital variables as indicators of managerial ability, an 
additional perspective, so called managerialism, exists to 
indicate that these variables may also reflect the amount 
of power executives have over corporate governance 
(Combs & Skill, 2003; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; 
Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). Combs and 
Skill (2003) and Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), for 
example, argued that CEOs with longer tenure would 
likely have greater influence over their Boards of Direc- 
tors, and hence would be more capable of “effectively 
dictating what their own pay will be” (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1989, p.124). Moreover, Grabke-Rundell and 
Gomez-Mejia (2002) explained that the accumulation of 
knowledge and experience could allow an executive to 
gain expert power, which results in high dependence of 
board members on the executive in determining the best 
  
 
allocation of organizational resources. Such dependence 
would likely place executives in a favorable position 
when they negotiate their contracts with the board, 
enabling them to use their discretion in the contracting 
process (Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). In 
particular, assuming that most executives are risk averse, 
an executive is thought to prefer fixed compensation 
over incentive-based compensation (e.g., bonuses) to 
bear less personal risk, given a certain level of the total 
compensation (Mehran, 1995). Therefore, the compensa- 
tion packages of executives who have great power over 
board members should likely include higher levels of 
fixed compensation. 
The latter perspective may be especially applicable to 
the college football context in which several experienced 
coaches have been described to have great influence over 
the university administration. One notable example is Joe 
Paterno, the former head football coach of Pennsylvania 
State University. Until the sexual abuse scandal of his 
assistant forced his departure, Paterno had remained the 
head coach of Penn State despite numerous attempts by 
the university’s senior administrators and athletic director 
to convince him to retire (Wieberg, 2011). The power of 
college football coaches at U.S. universities is further 
highlighted by the following statement of Gordon Gee, 
the president of The Ohio State University, in response 
to a question on the potential firing of the university’s 
then head football coach Jim Tressel: “Let me be very 
clear. I’m just hoping the coach doesn’t dismiss me” 
(Wieberg, 2011, para.31). These cases thus suggest that 
head football coaches with high human capital can gain 
power over university governance. In turn, such power 
may allow coaches to receive a compensation package 
where bonuses (i.e., variable compensation) account for 
a small proportion of the maximum total compensation. 
This leads to: 
Hypothesis 3: The proportion of maximum bonus in 
the maximum total compensation of the NCAA FBS 
head football coach is negatively associated with 
his human capital. 
 
Methods 
Sample Data 
To test the hypotheses, we examined compensation 
data of head football coaches at NCAA FBS institu- 
tions in 2006 and 2007. FBS is the most competitive 
football division in U.S. college football. It consists 
of 11 different conferences, each of which has 8–13 
schools, and three independent schools that do not 
belong to any particular conferences. There were 119 
FBS institutions in 2006 and 120 in 2007, resulting in 
a total of 239 university-year observations during this 
study period. From this initial pool, we restricted our 
study sample to coaches who served as head coach 
of any FBS football program at least one year in the 
past, to use career winning percentages at FBS as the 
measurement of past performance. This resulted in the 
exclusion of 24 observations, leading to a fi  sample 
of 215 university-year observations. 
 
Measures 
Coaching Compensation. We collected the compen- 
sation data of FBS head coaches from the USA Today’s 
online database in 2006 and 2007. This database lists 
three types of compensation data: salary, other income, 
and maximum bonus (USA Today, 2007). Salary includes 
regular payment directly from the university, such as base 
salary, deferred payment, and annuity payment. Other 
income refers to incomes from other agreements that are 
not related to salary, such as media deals and shoes and/ 
or apparel contracts. These two types of compensation 
capture the fi ed aspect of compensation since the amount 
of pay does not vary with the achievement of specific 
goals in the current season. In contrast, maximum bonus 
represents the variable aspect of coach compensation, 
referring to the greatest amount of additional payment 
that the coach can receive if his team meets prescribed 
goals related to on-field performance and other criteria 
(e.g., academic performance of student athletes). For the 
first dependent variable used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
we obtained the maximum total compensation value of 
each coach by summing the three types of compensation. 
In addition, to test Hypothesis 3, we included bonus 
proportion (i.e., the proportion of maximum bonus in 
maximum total compensation) as the second dependent 
variable. 
Past Performance. Consistent with Brook and Foster 
(2010) and Humphreys (2000), past performance of 
the coach was measured as his career FBS winning 
percentage before the season examined. 
Human Capital.   The literature has suggested that 
human capital increases with the amount of experience 
that a person has in relation to his or her job (Agarwal, 
1981). Furthermore, in the coaching context, Smart and 
his colleagues argued that experience of the coach can be 
divided into generic, industry (or league/division)-specific 
and firm (or program)-specific experiences (Smart et al., 
2008; Smart & Wolfe, 2003). The coach’s human capital 
was thus measured with three experience-related variables: 
age, past years as FBS head coach, and past tenure in 
the program. Age was a proxy for the coach’s generic 
experience and was measured as the chronological age of 
the head coach at the beginning of the season. Past years 
as a FBS head coach was a proxy for the coach’s FBS- 
specific  experience and was operationalized as the 
number of years for which the coach has served as 
head coach for any FBS programs. Past tenure was a 
proxy for the coach’s program-specific experience and 
was measured as the number of years for which the 
coach has served as the head coach of the current 
program. The results of exploratory factor analysis with 
the three variables showed that only one factor exceeded 
an eigenvalue of greater 1, which satisfies the Kaiser 
criterion (see Appendix). We thus used this factor 
(named “experience”) as an indicator of coaches’ human 
capital. 
  
 
 
 
Control Variables. To take into account the possible 
effect of alma mater status of the coach on his 
compensation, the study included a dummy variable, 
alma mater, which had the value of 1 if the coach served 
as the head coach in his alma mater and 0 for otherwise. 
In addition, since previous research suggests that coaches 
working for larger programs tend to receive higher 
compensation (e.g., Humphreys, 2000), the following 
two variables were included as indicators of program size: 
the seating capacity of the home football stadium and a 
dummy variable, BCS, with 1 for football programs that 
belong to Bowl Championship Series (BCS) conferences 
and 0 for otherwise.1 A dummy variable, urban 
campus, was also entered to control for the location 
effect on compensation (1 if the campus was located 
in either an urban or suburban area; 0 for otherwise). 
The fifth control variable, research university, 
had 1 if the university was classified in the “Research 
Universities—Very High Research Activity” (RU/ VH) 
classification in the Carnegie Classification of Institu- 
tions of Higher Education and 0 if otherwise; whereas 
the sixth control variable, public university, had 1 for 
public universities and 0 for private universities. These 
two dummy variables were included to capture the effect 
of the institutional status of the university where the 
coach worked. In addition, consistent with Kahn (2006), 
the possible effect of the coach’s race on compensation 
was controlled by including a dummy variable (named 
“race”) that had 1 for Caucasian coaches and 0 for non- 
Caucasian coaches. To distinguish coaches who newly 
served as the head coach of their programs, we included 
a dummy variable named new coach (1 for coaches who 
were in their first year as head coach at the universities; 
0 for otherwise). Finally, a year dummy (named “year 
2006”) was included to control for any differences in 
compensation by year (1 for the 2006 season; 0 for the 
2007 season). 
 
Analysis 
For the main analysis, we performed two separate ordi- 
nary least squares (OLS) regression analyses. Our full 
empirical model can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
Where the subscript i refers to the head coach and 
t refers to the year; Total compensation is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the coach’s annual maximum 
total compensation value; Bonus proportion is measured 
as the natural logarithm of the proportion of the coach’s 
maximum bonus value in his maximum total compensa- 
tion value; Career FBS winning % is the natural logarithm 
of the career winning percentage as a FBS head coach 
before the current season; Experience is a factor formed 
by age, past tenure, and years as FBS head coach; Alma 
mater has 1 for coaches who served as a head coach for 
their alma mater and 0 for otherwise; Stadium capacity 
is the natural logarithm of the maximum seating capac- 
ity of the home football stadium; BCS has 1 for football 
programs that belong to BCS conferences and 0 for oth- 
erwise; Urban campus has 1 if the university is located 
at either an urban or suburban area and 0 if otherwise; 
Research university has 1 if the university is classified in 
the RU/ VH classification in the Carnegie Classification 
of Institutions of Higher Education and 0 if otherwise; 
Public university has 1 for public universities and 0 for 
private universities; Race has 1 for Caucasian coaches 
and 0 for non- Caucasian coaches; New coach has 1 for 
coaches who newly served as the head coach of their 
programs, and 0 for otherwise; Year 2006 has 1 for 2006 
data and 0 for 2007 data. 
 
Results 
Descriptive Results 
Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics of selected 
coach characteristics. On average, the FBS football 
coaches included in the analysis had maximum annual 
total pay of $1,284,725, 19% of which was accounted for 
by maximum bonus compensation. With respect to their 
past performance, the coaches had an average career FBS 
winning percentage of 54%. As for the experience-related 
characteristics, the average age of the coaches was 53, 
and they on average had served as head coach of their 
current programs for about five years and for any FBS 
football programs for about eight years. 
Table 2 shows the correlations among the variables 
included in the regression analysis. The results indicated 
that total compensation had a significant correlation with 
career FBS winning percentage (r = .47) and experience 
(r = .26), consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. Other 
control variables that had a significant correlation with 
total compensation include: stadium capacity (r = .82), 
research university (r = .51), BCS (r = .77), and urban 
campus (r = .22). As for bonus proportion, research uni- 
versity (r = .15), public university (r = .34), new coach (r 
= .17), and Year 2006 (r = -.21) had a significant correla- 
tion, but experience was not significantly associated with 
the outcome (r = -.11). While this result was in conflict 
with Hypothesis 3, the negative effect of experience was 
further assessed through regression. 
 
Testing of Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Issues 
Before performing the regression analysis, we evaluated 
the assumptions of homoscedasticity and independence of 
errors that are essential for obtaining unbiased parameter 
estimates in OLS regression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). 
  
 
Table 1   Descriptive Summary of the Individual Characteristics of FBS Head Coaches 
 
Variables N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total compensation 184 1,284,724.82 918,504.05 130,000.00 4,365,000.00 
Bonus proportion 184 0.19 0.14 0.00 .60 
Career FBS winning percentage 215 0.54 0.17 0.08 1.00 
Past years as FBS head coach 215 7.79 6.94 1.00 41.00 
Past tenure in the program 215 5.10 5.41 0.00 41.00 
Age 215 52.63 5.41 32.00 81.00 
 
 
 
Table 2   Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
1. Total 
compensatio
na 
13.76 0.85        
2. Bonus 
proportio
na 
0.17 0.11 0.28      
3. Career 
FBS 
winning 
percentag
ea 
0.43 0.11 0.47 0.14     
4. Experience 0.03 0.88 0.26 -0.11 0.35    
5. Alma mater 0.16 0.37 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.03   
6. Stadiu
m 
capacit
ya 
10.79 0.44 0.82 0.09 0.38 0.27 0.02  
7. Researc
h 
universit
y 
0.48 0.50 0.51 0.15 0.24 0.21 0.00 0.56 
8. BCS 0.57 0.50 0.77 0.14 0.29 0.16 0.01 0.75 0.62      
9. Urban campus 0.83 0.38 0.22 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.04     
10. Public 0.95 0.22 0.05 0.34 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.12 -0.04 -0.10    
 university               
11. Race 0.95 0.22 -0.07 -0.09 0.06 0.15 -0.18 -0.12 -0.08 -0.15 0.03 -0.05   
12. New coach 0.05 0.23 0.12 0.17 0.13 -0.12 -0.10 0.02 0.10 0.16 -0.02 0.05 0.05  
13. Year 2006 0.54 0.50 -0.14 -0.21 -0.10 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.21 0.05 -0.17 
Note. N = 184; p < .05 for all |r| ³ .15; p < .01 for all |r| ³ .20; a Natural logarithm values are used. 
 
 
 
First, to assess the assumption of homoscedasticity, we 
performed the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test 
(Breusch & Pagan, 1979). This test indicates the pres- 
ence of heteroscedasticity if an associated chi-square 
value yields a significant result. In the current analysis, 
the two regression models did not have a significant chi- 
square value at the 5% level of significance, confirming 
the nonexistence of heteroscedasticity. 
Second, the assumption of the independence of errors 
was evaluated using the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic 
(d) after arranging the data by conference 
membership2 (Gujarati, 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2006). The DW tests for the two regressions yielded 
a d value of 1.67 for the Total Compensation model 
and a d value of 1.66 for the Bonus Proportion model. 
These two values lie between a lower bound of 1.56 
and an upper bound of 
1.79 obtained from DW statistics tables for the current 
sample size (184) and number of exploratory variables 
(11).3 According to decision rules used for the DW 
test, 
  
 
 
the result that the two d values lie between the 
lower and upper bounds does not allow us to make 
a decision on whether spatial autocorrelation is 
present (Gujarati, 2003). In other words, while there 
is no conclusive evi- dence for autocorrelation, the 
possibility of autocorrela- tion cannot be rejected. 
Given this result, the following presents the results 
of the Newey-West procedure, robust estimation for 
the presence of autocorrelation, along with the results 
of the standard OLS regressions. 
 
Testing of Hypotheses 
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS regression 
analy- sis. Due to the unavailability of 
compensation data for some coaches in the USA 
Today’s database, the analysis included 184 
observations for both models. 
The results showed that the independent 
variables collectively explained a substantial 
proportion of the vari- ance in total compensation 
(Adj. R2= .77). Specifically, 
  
 
Table 3   Results of OLS Regression Analysis 
 
 Total compensation    Bonus proportion  
Variables B 𝛃 t  B 𝛃 t 
Career FBS winning percentage 1.3
4 
.17 4.08**  .11 .11 1.34 
Experience .00 .01 .11  -.02 -.18 -2.30* 
Alma mater -.02 -.01 -.20  .02 .07 .92 
Stadium capacity .90 .46 7.67**  -.03 -.12 -1.03 
BCS .72 .42 6.72**  .04 .19 1.62 
Urban campus .28 .12 3.20**  .03 .09 1.17 
Research university -.14 -.08 -1.65  .01 .04 .43 
Public university .09 .02 .57  .17 .32 4.31** 
Race .13 .03 .89  -.01 -.03 -.38 
New coach .03 .01 .21  .04 .08 1.08 
Year 2006 -.16 -.09 -2.47*  -.03 -.12 -1.71 
Adjusted R2 .77    .16   
N 184    184   
χ2 3.6
9 
   .62   
d 1.6
7 
   1.66   
Note. B = unstandardized coefficient; β = standardized coefficient; χ2 = chi square value obtained for the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrage Multiplier test; d = 
Durbin-Watson statistic; * p < .05, ** p < .01. N = 184. 
 
 
 
along with the significant positive effects of stadium 
capacity (β = .46; t value = 7.67, p < .01), BCS (β = .42; 
t value = 6.72, p < .01) and urban campus (β = .12; t 
value = 3.20, p < .01), and the significant negative effect 
of Year 2006 (β = -.16; t value = -2.47, p < .05), career 
FBS winning percentage was found to have a significant 
positive effect on total compensation (β = .17; t value = 
4.08, p < .01). This finding indicates that coaches with 
higher past performance received higher levels of com- 
pensation, consistent with Hypothesis 1. On the contrary, 
the results did not provide support for the positive effect 
of experience on total compensation (β = .01; t value = 
.11, p = .91), which led to the rejection of Hypothesis 2. 
In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that coaches with more 
experience would receive a lower proportion of bonus 
in the maximum total compensation. This hypothesis 
was tested by regressing bonus proportion on the same 
independent variables included in the first model. The 
overall model accounted for a small but significant pro- 
portion of the variance in bonus proportion (F-value = 
4.21, p < .01; Adj. R2= .16).4 Furthermore, in line with 
our prediction, experience had a significant negative 
effect 
on bonus proportion (β = -.18; t value = -2.30, p < .05), 
supporting Hypothesis 3. 
 
Robustness Check 
Although the assumption of homoscedasticity was 
confirmed for the current analysis, the assumption of 
independence of errors was not fully resolved based on 
the results of the DW test reported earlier. Therefore, 
to further address this concern, we performed a robust 
statistical procedure developed by Newey and West 
(1987) as additional regression analysis. The Newey-West 
procedure is designed to handle both autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity by calculating the corrected standard 
errors, named HAC (heteroscedasticity- and autocorrela- 
tion- consistent) standard errors (Gujarati, 2003; Newey 
& West, 1987). The use of HAC standard errors has been 
shown to address the infl of t values attributed to both 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, providing robust 
results for ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, regard- 
less of the presence of the two issues (Gujarati, 2003). 
Table 4 provides results of the two regression analy- 
ses with the Newey-West procedure. Although changes 
in t values were observed, the results provided consistent 
support for the positive effect of FBS winning percentage 
on total compensation (B = 1.34; t value = 4.22, p < .01) 
and the negative effect of experience on bonus proportion 
(B = -.02; t value = -2.39, p < .05), while rejecting the 
positive effect of experience on total compensation (B = 
.00; t value = .13, p = .89). These results thus validated 
the robustness of the OLS parameter estimates discussed 
above. 
 
Discussion 
This study investigated how the past performance and 
human capital of head football coaches at NCAA FBS 
institutions would influence their compensation by 
examining the compensation data of these coaches 
in 2006–2007. Consistent with marginal productivity 
theory, the results indicate that the maximum total 
compensation of football coaches increases with their 
past performance. On the contrary, the analysis does not 
identify a positive relationship between coaches’ human 
capital and maximum total compensation after control- 
ling for their past performance and other personal and 
  
 
 
 
Table 4   Results of Regression Analysis with the Newey-West Procedure 
   
Total compensation Bonus proportion 
 
Variables B S.E. t  B S.E. t 
Career FBS winning percentage 1.34 .32 4.22**  .11 .08 1.36 
Experience .00 .03 .13  -.02 .01 -2.39* 
Alma mater -.02 .10 -.18  .02 .03 .74 
Stadium capacity .90 .11 8.04**  -.03 .03 -.92 
BCS .72 .12 6.02**  .04 .03 1.55 
Urban campus .28 .07 4.23**  .03 .02 1.31 
Research university -.14 .08 -1.66  .01 .02 .46 
Public university .09 .14 .64  .17 .02 7.94** 
Race .13 .10 1.30  -.01 .03 -.48 
New coach .03 .13 .24  .04 .04 1.02 
Year 2006 -.16 .06 -2.98*  -.03 .02 -1.78 
Adjusted R2 .77    .16   
N 184    184   
Note. B = unstandardized coefficient; S.E. = HAC standard error; * p < .05, ** p < .01. N = 184. 
 
 
 
institutional characteristics. While this rejects the pre- 
diction drawn from human capital theory, human capital 
is found to influence the structure of compensation; 
coaches with greater human capital are likely to receive 
a compensation package where fixed compensation 
accounts for a higher percentage of the total compensa- 
tion, supporting the perspective of human capital theory 
and managerialism. 
Despite the several cases indicating the absence of 
the pay-performance relationship in the college football 
context (e.g., McMurphy, 2011; Zimbalist, 2010), the 
current finding shows that past performance of FBS 
head football coaches positively affects their maximum 
total compensation, providing justification for the high 
compensation of these coaches at least to some extent. 
It should be noted that this finding is in conflict with 
the results of extant studies identifying no relationship 
between pay and performance of elite sport coaches 
(Frick & Simmons, 2008; Kahn, 2006; Smart et al., 
2008). These studies, however, differ from the current 
study in that they examined the effect of performance 
on coaching compensation at professional sport settings, 
such as the National Basketball Association (NBA; 
Kahn, 2000), Major League Baseball (MLB; Smart et 
al., 2000), and Bundesliga (Frick & Simmons, 2008). 
In contrast, this study as well as Humphreys (2000) and 
Brook and Foster (2010), the other two studies finding 
a positive relationship between pay and performance, 
tested this relationship at college sport settings. Conse- 
quently, these conflicting results may support the notion 
discussed earlier that college coaches could play a more 
important role in the success of their teams due to their 
greater responsibilities for player development and the 
acquisition of talent than their professional counterparts. 
That is, given their greater levels of contributions to 
team performance, college coaches are more likely to 
 
be compensated based on their past performance than 
coaches of professional teams. 
It is also noteworthy that when compared with Tosi, 
Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Meija’s (2000) finding that 
performance measures on average explained less than 5% 
of the variance in the compensation of CEOs, the results 
of the correlation analysis indicate that the variance of 
career winning percentage overlaps with that of the total 
compensation of college football coaches for over 20% 
(R2 = .22). This result appears to suggest that there is 
a greater congruence between pay and performance in 
the current setting than in the corporate setting. 
However, while the above discussions highlight the 
important role of past performance in determining the 
compensation of college football coaches, the examina- 
tion of the standardized regression results indicate that 
the two indicators of program size, stadium capacity (b 
= .46) and BCS (b = .42), had greater effects than did 
past performance (b = .17). That is, universities that offer 
a similar level of institutional support for their football 
programs tend to provide their head football coaches 
with a similar level of compensation, regardless of past 
performance of the coaches. This implies the prevalence 
of benchmarking among collegiate athletic administrators 
in determining the compensation of their coaches, a prac- 
tice that could lead to the further escalation of coaching 
compensation due to universities’ efforts to keep up with 
their rival institutions. A reassessment of compensation 
practices thus may be necessary to provide coaches with 
more appropriate pay that better reflects their values in 
the labor market. 
Although this study does not identify the positive 
effect of coaches’ human capital on their maximum 
total compensation, the non-significant effect of human 
capital can be explained by the fact that the current con- 
text provides a clear performance measure. As noted, 
  
 
athletic administrators are thought to align human 
capital measures with the coach’s compensation since 
they may indicate his unobserved ability (Spence, 1973). 
However, it may not be necessary for the administra- 
tors to rely on human capital measures in the context 
of sport where measures of past performance can serve 
as a clearer indicator of the coach’s ability to achieve 
on-field success. In addition, while the previous studies 
on coaching compensation found the significant effect of 
experience on compensation (Fricker & Simons, 2008; 
Smart et al., 2008), they failed to include a comprehen- 
sive set of control variables in their analyses. Indeed, 
the current analysis also shows a significant 
correlation between experience and maximum total 
compensation; this relationship, however, disappears 
when the factor is included with the other 
determinants. This may sug- gest that human capital 
is a less important factor in determining the level of 
coaching compensation than past performance. 
Nonetheless, one notable finding regarding the 
effect of human capital is that it has a significant  
negative effect on bonus proportion. That is, coaches 
tend to receive a lower proportion of bonus in their 
total compensation if they have a greater level of 
human capital. As noted earlier, this relationship is 
consistent with the perspective derived from human 
capital theory that bonus compensation has little use 
for experienced coaches as their ability is 
manifested in their high human capital. Moreover, 
this finding may reflect a power imbalance between 
athletic administrators and head football coaches; the 
accumulation of knowledge, experience and skills 
increases the expert power of coaches, allowing 
them to have influence over athletic administrators in 
designing the structure of pay. While a number of 
examples indicate that experienced college coaches 
can possess great power in their institutions, the 
current research provides some of the first empirical 
evidence on how these coaches can exert their discretion 
in the contracting processes. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
We acknowledge the following limitations within the cur- 
rent research and suggest directions for future research 
based on these limitations. First, the current dataset 
includes compensation and other related data over a two 
year period. Since the use of the short-term observations 
limits our ability to examine the long-term relationships 
among performance, human capital, and compensation, 
future research can conduct more comprehensive inves- 
tigation of these relationships by including multiple-year 
data. Second, our results are based on the data of one 
sector of the sport industry. Given that compensation and 
performance data of other sectors of the sport industry 
(e.g., college basketball) are readily available, future 
research should investigate the effects of performance 
and human capital on compensation using different 
sport samples. Third, while this study solely focused on 
the expert power of coaches manifested in their levels 
of human capital, Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia 
(2002) identified other types of managerial power, such 
as structural and prestige power. Therefore, additional 
investigations should be conducted to examine how 
different types of power may influence the structure of 
coaching compensation. Finally, this study did not 
analyze the detailed contract structures of college 
football coaches. The USA Today’s database lists the 
actual contracts of the majority of the coaches at 
public institutions, which provide detailed information 
regarding incentives, con- tract terms, and breach of 
contract. Therefore, in-depth content analysis of these 
contracts should provide a more comprehensive insight 
into the determinants of coaching compensation. 
In conclusion, the results of this study make a sig- 
nificant contribution to the literature by identifying the 
positive relationship between past performance and com- 
pensation of FBS college football coaches. Furthermore, 
this study provides new insight into the extant body of 
knowledge by demonstrating that human capital can play 
an important role in determining the structure of coach- 
ing compensation. 
 
Notes 
1. Of the 11 individual conferences constituting the 
NCAA FBS division, six conferences are collectively 
called “BCS conferences.” These BCS conferences 
receive automatic bids for their conference champion to 
the Bowl Championship Series (BCS), and consist of 
schools that provide substantial support for their 
football programs. 
2. Due to the use of panel data (i.e., longitudinal 
cross- sectional data), the current analysis may be 
subjected to spatial autocorrelation, or “correlation 
in space” (Gujarati, 2003, p.405). Since the analysis 
of spatial autocorrelation requires the ordering of 
data based on a spatial characteristic, we arranged the 
data by “conference membership.” The use of 
conference membership is appropriate because 
schools in a given conference are often located in 
nearby regions and are assumed to use similar coaching 
compensation due to frequent interactions and 
communication among member schools, when 
compared with schools in another conference. That is, 
a sys- tematic pattern in coaching compensation 
practice may exist depending on membership in 
different conferences. It should also be noted that 
while the Durbin-Watson test is mainly used for 
assessing autocorrelation in time series data, this test 
can serve as an assessment of spatial autocorrelation if 
the data are arranged by a categorical variable relating 
to spatial variation (van Stel, 2006). 
3. Durbin-Watson statistics tables offer certain 
lower and upper bounds based on sample size and 
the number of explanatory variables used in a model, 
and these bounds are used to determine whether the 
model has autocorrelation (Gujarati, 2003). In 
particular, if a computed Durbin-Watson value (d) is 
  
 
less than a lower bound (dL), there is evidence of 
positive autocorrelation. If d is greater than an 
upper bound (dU) but smaller than (4 – dU), there is 
no evidence of positive autocorrelation. Finally, if d 
lies between dL  and dU, there is 
  
 
inconclusive evidence regarding the presence or 
absence of positive autocorrelation. 
4. The low adjusted R-squared value may suggest 
that this model is subjected to model specific errors 
(Gujarati, 2003). To address this concern, we performed 
Ramsey’s RESET test (Ramsey, 1969; see Gujarati 
(2003) for detailed procedures). Results showed that 
the inclusion of additional regressors proposed by 
Ramsey (1969) did not significantly improve the 
model fit, providing support for the adequate 
specification of the original model. 
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Appendix 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Results for 
Experience-Related Variables 
  
Variables Factor Loadings 
  
Age .72 
Past tenure in the program .63 
 
Years as a FBS head coach .89 
Eigenvalue 1.70 
% of variance explained 56.60
% 
   Number of observations 215   
